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ABSTRACT

Buchsbaum III, Robert Michael. M.A. Department of History, Wright State University,
2014. The Surprising Role of Legal Traditions in the Rise of Abolitionism in Great
Britain’s Development.

The abolition of British slavery in the 19th century raises the question of how the British
achieved antislavery against colonial opposition. While historical theories have focused
on economic, political and religious factors, no account of abolition is complete without a
thorough investigation of the history of evolving British legal traditions. This thesis
analyzed a number of British homeland court cases and antislavery laws. English legal
traditions established principles of freedom long before abolition in Britain, and then
upheld them in respect to blacks on British soil in the 18th century. On the other hand,
these traditions exposed a void in British homeland law on slavery that failed to provide
any positive legal basis for freedom beyond its shores, forcing abolitionists into a long
battle to build social and political pressures to create such positive laws. This was
facilitated by a gradual expansion of Parliamentary authority to impose such antislavery
laws.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The four chief evils of the world still exist: death, war, famine and disease.
However, an even more pernicious evil, slavery, predates war. The United Nations still
lists slavery as the world’s greatest evil and devotes much of its influence and rhetoric in
working toward the eradication of all forms of slavery from the modern world, starting
with its legal foundations.
In a world which had known the institutions of slavery since ancient times, how
do we explain or understand the enormity of Britain’s achievement of being the first
nation to effect the complete abolition of slavery in the first half of the 19th century? It is
clearly a complicated topic with many attempts at interpretation.
What makes Britain unique, or at least different enough from the other leading
European states of the 17th through 19th centuries, such as France, Spain, and Portugal, to
allow the British to be the first to arrive at abolition? Some of the reasons have to do with
differences in the way the law was utilized and formulated by each of these states’
governments. The French had slave laws, the Code Noir (The Black code: based on Louis
XIV’s edict of 1685 modified with later decrees was used to police slavery in France till
the French Revolution of 1789), that was recognized and enforced, with rare exceptions,
by France’s court system. The Spanish developed a codified system of slavery laws that
were enforceable throughout the Spanish empire, from homeland to colonies in the New
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World. Portugal was similar to these two in the way it developed and implemented its
laws of slavery, like many other countries with slavery. Britain, however, was different in
all of these respects. The British did not have a formal constitution, but instead a
hodgepodge of court precedents and Parliamentary acts that were collectively and
figuratively bundled together into something vaguely acknowledged at times as a British
“constitution.” The British laws on slavery had developed in a dichotomous fashion,
with elaborate and detailed, and enforceable, slave laws and codes written by colonial
governments, while the British homeland retained only antiquated and ill-defined slave
laws from medieval times. By the late 18th century, despite the attempts by proslavery
British interests to enact new slave laws and improve enforceability, the old slave laws of
the British homeland had fallen into disuse, and were ripe for being formally discarded.
In short, the very nature of British common law, and the dichotomous treatment
of slavery laws by its colonies in contrast to the homeland made the British state more
ready than others for the development of abolitionism and antislavery by the end of the
18th century. At the same time, however, the British hesitated to act, fearful of the social
and political upheavals in revolutionary France, which fitfully moved towards abolition.
Many in the British governing class therefore linked abolition to dangerous revolutionary
radicalism. However, such alarmist views eventually lost their force in the British
homeland, opening a channel for the ultimate implementation of antislavery laws that
would be extended to the entire British Empire by 1833. Since the United States
inherited the British common law system in its judicial processes, along with many
natural rights philosophies, there was in America a similar foundation for eventual
abolition comparable to that in Britain.
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Historians have worked hard to understand the development of antislavery in
Britain, though they have not always agreed on the how to explain it. This thesis pursues
an approach focused on the evolution of British law in respect to the status of slaves.
Attention to the development of law offers insights into the unfolding of the abolitionist
process. The Mansfield decisions and subsequent court cases in the 1770s and 1780s
created the legal foundations of antislavery, but not the legal tools to carry it out,
especially in the colonial periphery. As a sort of two-edged sword, English legal
traditions established the principles of freedom long before abolition in Britain, and
upheld them in respect to blacks on British soil in the 18th century. On the other hand,
these traditions failed to provide any positive legal basis for freedom beyond its shores,
forcing abolitionists into a long battle to build social and political pressures to create such
positive laws. In this respect, abolition began and ended with the law. No account of
abolition is complete without a thorough investigation of its history.

EXPLANATIONS OF ANTISLAVERY
The original school of historical analysis that followed British emancipation of
slaves in 1834 was essentially moralistic, touting the virtuous nature of abolitionists in
righting the wrongs of slavery by ending the institution. Biographers and historians of the
post-abolition era hailed the most well-known abolitionists, such as Sharp, Ramsay and
Wilberforce as liberators who forwarded the humanitarian virtues of the British middle
and upper classes. This was bolstered by the petition support of the laboring classes.
Historians did not try to determine the underlying forces of abolitionism. Later
generations of historians regarded this approach as subjective, hagiographic and self-
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congratulatory. Their corrective to this was, first, an economic theory of antislavery,
followed by attacks on the economic theory using other perspectives and methods.
The revisionist school, led by Harvard-trained Trinidadian historian Eric
Williams, claimed that inevitable economic decline of the slave trade and competition
from the competing system of free labor capitalism was the underlying reason for
abolition. Revisionists slammed humanitarian virtues as irrelevant to abolition. More
recent scholars such as Anstey, Drescher, Davis, Craton, and Brown disputed Williams’s
Marxist theory and focused instead on religious ideology, social class divisions, or grass
roots politics. While post-revisionism did fully explain why British abolitionism was so
slow to develop and why it required decades of campaigning to overcome proslavery
policy. A more focused legal perspective offers additional advantages in explaining the
abolitionist process. For instance, it can help explain the course and ultimate success of
the abolitionist movement in Britain. Historians have often portrayed the key antagonists
to British abolitionism as Caribbean planters and the key proponents as Quakers,
Evangelists, or working class laborers. An additional legal perspective looks at the actors
differently, as litigants in court cases seeking to obtain advantages in either proslavery
interests or abolitionist interests.
Eric Williams, the originator of revisionism, asserted that the rise and fall of the
British sugar economy, as seen from the perspective of capitalism, led to the rise and fall
of British colonial slavery. This Marxist view of capitalist determinism regarded British
slavery as tenable only so long as it supported profiteering from entrepreneurs who had
economic interests in the sugar industry of Britain. As soon as that industry began to
falter economically, British slavery failed to be essential to the British economy, allowing
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it to slowly dissipate under the attack of abolitionism, a process that took several decades
to become a de facto reality. For Williams, the economic decline of British slave products
eventually forced slavery out of business. Williams regarded British claims of
abolitionist morality to be a form of hypocrisy shielding the underlying reality of
capitalist expediency:
Seen in historical perspective, it forms a part of that general picture of the harsh
treatment of the underprivileged classes, the unsympathetic poor laws and severe
feudal law, and the indifference with which the rising capitalist class
was…sacrificing human life to deity of increased production.1
As such, he did not regard political factors, religious ethics, or legal tradition to be
relevant. For Williams, British law had no bearing whatsoever on abolitionism or its
delays.2 Williams’s critics would enlarge the range of possibilities to explain abolitionism
from a more multi-factorial and non-economically dominant perspective.
Michael Craton believed the political factors behind abolitionism were strong
reasons for abolition’s success, in addition to economic decline. In The Sinews of Empire
(1974), Craton asserts that the West Indies proslavery interests conspired to influence
Parliament sufficiently to defeat and forestall any attempts at abolition. “Throughout the
age of the elder Pitt…the presence in Parliament itself of 50 to 60 MPs with West Indian
or slave-trading affiliations was more than enough to ensure that their interests swayed

1

Eric Eustace Williams, Capitalism and Slavery(Paperback) (Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North
Carolina Press, 1944), 5.
2

Ibid., 3-212.
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debates and influenced the minister informally.”3 Craton does not add that the early
proslavery leanings of the House of Lords and the Royals were equally important factors.
Craton also asserts that in the latter years of the eighteenth century, the West
Indies lobby group lost most of its parliamentary influence.4 Craton believes their loss of
lobby power led to the eventual passage of the slave trade abolition law in 1807. Similar
to the revisionists, Craton believes the eventual decline in the price of sugar on the world
market had a detrimental political effect on plantations and plantation owners.5 In many
ways, Craton and William share similar views of economic decline as the spark that
galvanized abolition. Craton appears to echo Williams’s economic decline theory, in the
sense that the weakening of the plantation lobby’s parliamentary clout by 1807 caused
their opposition to the slave trade bill to fail. Craton’s view was essentially economic
explanation, and therefore dependent on the advantages and disadvantages of an
economic focus to explain a major event like emancipation. Among the disadvantages
was its inability to account for legal and political trends that helped mold Britain into an
antislavery empire.
Roger Anstey challenged the economic decline theory in his magnum opus, The
Atlantic Slave Trade and Abolition: 1760-1810 (1975). He asserts that Christian
liberalism accounts for the success of British abolitionism. Christianity (especially
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Michael Craton, Sinews of Empire: A Short History of British Slavery (New York: Anchor Press, 1974), 241.
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Ibid., 246.
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Ibid., 268.
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Quakers and Evangelicals) developed the ethics concept of benevolence to fuel
abolitionism. As Anstey notes,
The relevance of theological developments to anti-slavery reform lay in the
theological origins and religious dimension of the powerful idea of benevolence;
in the reinforcement of belief in a providential order as a sanction on conduct; and
in that important root of the idea of progress which consisted in the belief in
revelation as progressive with the necessary corollary that the Christian was
called to new commitment as he received new revelation.6
To Anstey, religious progressivism via benevolence created a necessary, but not
sufficient, condition for abolition, so that it was one of the originating forces of abolition.
This view is supplemented by egalitarianism in Quaker philosophy.
For Anstey, the economic decline theory does not account for the success of
abolitionism. Rather, abolitionism, a humanitarian project, stalled during the Napoleonic
wars between England and France. The West Indies lobby delayed and frustrated one
abolitionist legislative project after another for a considerable number of years, long after
politics had shifted against them, but ultimately failed to prevent abolition. Great
Britain’s national perception of the economic value of the West Indies to Britain’s
Empire prevented passage of anti-slave bills. Anstey had no interest in the role of the
British legal system in the fortunes of abolitionism. The main focus of Anstey’s view is a
humanitarian explanation for antislavery. The advantage of this approach is the way it
supplements economic views such as those of Williams and Craton. The disadvantage of
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Roger Anstey, The Atlantic Slave Trade and British Abolition 1760-1810 (New Jersey: Humanities Press,
1975), 405.
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Anstey’s focus is that it does not synchronize well with economic or political trends that
helped shape England toward an antislavery orientation.7
David Brion Davis doubts the adequacy of “a simple dichotomy of ‘economic
motives’ and ‘humanitarian ideals’” to explain the British trajectory of abolition.8
Instead, Davis approaches British antislavery from a legal perspective ramified by social,
economic and political considerations. He approaches abolitionism as a legal
phenomenon that reflects an earlier phase of antagonism between homeland and colonies
with a final formulation of national law that guaranteed abolition for British slaves in the
colonies (except for a few left out in the law, such as India). Instead of seeing abolition as
an economic or humanitarian process, Davis sees it as essentially a legal battle that was
eventually won by abolitionists, once their opponents had weakened sufficiently to lose
their earlier grip over Parliament in the form of proslavery lobbying. Davis develops the
idea of a permissive Parliament that is able to “contain” abolitionism “within the
boundaries of the existing order” by allowing abolitionism to have a voice but not letting
that voice result in legal change.9 This strategy of containment ultimately failed, despite
the proslavery influence of the West Indian lobby because the proslavery lobby lacked,
“constitutional protection against newer and more vigorous interests.”10

7

Ibid., 1-456.
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David Brion Davis, The Problem of Slavery in the Age of Revolution 1770-1823 (London: Cornell University
Press, 1975), 85.
9

Ibid., 102.
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Ibid., 103.
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While the legalistic analysis of Davis is a distinctively ideological explanation,
and helps draw together multiple elements that paralleled trends in the law, it does not
clearly reflect the political mechanisms trending during the 19th century in Britain. Davis’
analysis looks first at Parliamentary laws and secondarily at court cases. The relationship
between socioeconomics and British national law depends, for him, on the close
association between elites supporting slavery and their ability to maintain parliamentary
inertia with respect to critical defining areas in British slavery. The result of this is his
recognition of a muddle of imprecise and inadequate legislation that does not really touch
upon slavery issues for the empire as a whole. Second, Davis uses court cases to
differentiate between what he sees as three different areas of intersecting and overlapping
law, which are namely international law, British imperial law, and domestic labor law.
While noting both legislative and judicial trends, Davis differs from our approach
in not relating the two in a developmental way to show how the tools of the judiciary
cases were a necessary prelude to the later legislative defining acts. He also focuses more
on the interplay between the three kinds of court cases as examples of a development of
domestic ideology that turns Britain from a proslavery to an antislavery stance over the
course of a century. In contrast, our analysis looks more at the relationship between
mainly British homeland court cases, not as much the international ones or the strictly
domestic labor ones, because the homeland cases were the actual proving ground for the
development of new legal rights for black slaves such as legal standing and habeas
corpus, whereas the other areas of law Davis discusses acted in a retrograde fashion to
impede the eventual progress of British legislation which drew most heavily on the
progress made in the homeland court cases. For example, Davis asserts that
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“This would have conformed with the 1729 opinions of Yorke and Talbot, which
were much respected by Lord Mansfield, and would also have prevented
irrelevant debates on villeinage…however, for common-law courts, governed as
they were by ancient writs and procedures, to separate property rights from
questions of status and dominion.” 11
However, where Davis and we agree is that at the beginning of this progression is that
British law, both legislative and judicial, was in a positive vacuum that essentially
amounted to a type of lawlessness in the sense of so many areas that lacked legal
definition and clarity. The effect this muddle had on the time sequence of abolition is not
directly addressed by Davis, and it must be realized that Britain was the first major power
to free the slaves, so that the issue of the slowing or tempo of the event is not comparable
or relevant.
In addition, Davis’ analysis of court cases is fairly diffuse in its attempt to relate
the three areas of law to domestic ideology, so that it does not provide a direct trajectory
that feeds into the legislative cycle. Our approach, on the other hand, narrowly considers
a select group of landmark court cases and shows how they were directly instrumental in
providing necessary legal tools to assist blacks, not only, in winning new kinds of court
cases in which slaves had legal standing, but in predisposing an evolving Parliament to
greater sensitivity to the growing popularity for abolitionism that had increasingly taken
hold in the homeland during the latter decades of the 18th century.
While Davis’ point of view converges toward Craton’s idea of a progressively
ineffectual West Indies lobby in Parliament, the dynamics involved are much more
legalistic for Davis. He focuses on the key role played by conflicting jurisdictional
authority in the British legal system. For instance, there were numerous examples of
11

Ibid., 480.
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positive laws reinforcing the institution of slavery in the colonies, and the exact opposite,
a zone of absence of relevant law, acting to in the British homeland. This dichotomy
between positive and absent laws came to a head with the American Revolution, but in
terms of British legal authority, parallel expressions occurred in the Jamaican House of
Assembly’s resolutions of 1807 in which that colonial legislative body “asserted its
exclusive and absolute right to make all laws for the internal governing of the island.”12
This clash of internal jurisdictions and external legislatures, for Davis, explains why
British abolition had such a long and thorny path. Davis refers to this clash as a
“controversy [that] continued over the precise limits of governmental jurisdiction,” a
controversy with international implications since it affected not only Britain but also
those nations with similar jurisprudence principles such as France and the newly formed
United States.13
Within this larger legal analysis, Davis suggests that the groundbreaking Somerset
court decision of 1772 exposed the conflict between competing kinds of jurisdiction and
laws. Davis views Somerset as going beyond personal civil suit situations:

The earlier judicial cases concerning Negroes had little to do with the law of
nations, maritime law, or even the legality of slavery in England. Rather, they
involved civil disputes over the ownership of individual slaves…the specific issue
raised by such actions was whether the English laws protecting personal property
could be extended to protect the owners of errant slaves.14

12

Ibid., 118.

13

Ibid., 149.

14

Ibid., 477.
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Davis asserts that the importance of Somerset lay in the effect it had on later British
cases: That British judges determined whether the common law of England was to apply,
or the laws that controlled maritime relations between the nations. Because black slaves
imported from Africa were not originally British natives, in Davis’s view, the arguments
about the British roots underlying villeinage led to a conflict of the laws which
culminated in Somerset. For Davis, “…the contradiction between an alien form of
commercial property and common-law-traditions of domestic liberty” were at issue
because “…there were no rules for regulating the subjects of a labor system totally
foreign to the path of English development.”15
One of the things lacking in Davis’ legalistic analysis of court cases is a
consideration of the progression in jurisdictional authority. While he notes differences
between colonial and homeland treatment with perceptions of slavery and slave laws, as
well as the jurisdictional gulf between the two geographic areas, his analysis lacks a time
perspective to show how England’s parliamentary authority needed to develop once the
tools were in place, to extend its antislavery jurisdiction from homeland to maritime
waters to colonies. The reason that the history of legal development is critical is because
it provided an explanation for why England as an empire changed from initially
permissive slavery to a dichotomous jurisdiction, where only the homeland was
antislavery, to a final expanded version where the entire empire was antislavery. As the
legal environment of court cases first and parliamentary law second, changed in favor of
antislavery, so did the jurisdictional authority of Parliament over the empire showing that
these two events were fundamentally linked. This process was not immediate but
15

Ibid., 478.
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required many years, essentially from the latter half of the 18th century to nearly the
middle of the 19th century, to mature.
At this time in British history, two separate legal issues were at stake. In many
court cases, jurists tried to clarify the distinction between rights of ownership in property
and the rights of dominion.16 Somerset was about dominion (the right of control of an
object such as people or property), not property rights.17 Although metropolitans and
colonials disputed the scope of the Somerset decision, the abolitionists maintained that
“…the only slavery that could be legal in England was that which had long been
extinct.”18
The court cases noted as critical by Davis did not solve the issue of jurisdictional
conflict of laws, nor did they facilitate the slowly evolving actualization of Parliamentary
supremacy. This was mainly because these court cases failed at the enforcement of nonParliamentary, court-made, and metropolitan common law in the colonial periphery,
including the West Indies. At this time, there was neither broad based acceptance nor an
established system for that kind of enforcement or systematization of the laws. Britain did
not even have a formal constitution, but its constitutional component was an amorphous
collection of its laws, judicial and legislative, considered as a hodge-podge gestalt. Davis
also implies that the colonial lobbyists (led by the West Indies group), as well as many
Members of Parliament in the Commons, the Lords, the Privy Council, and most of the

16

Ibid., 480.

17

Ibid., 480.

18

Ibid., 483.
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Royals endorsed a stunted imperial trajectory of constitutionalism, at the expense of
uniform jurisdictional reach from central government in London to the colonies.
Attempting to integrate multiple prior views into one paradigm that accepts the
power of ideology glossed over by some of his predecessors, Seymour Drescher’s
Capitalism and Antislavery (1986) asserts that the forces of industrial capitalism and
public opinion made British abolitionism succeed:
The disparity between metropolitan and colonial norms made the wrongs of
Africa seem more nearly the negation of all rights than any other abuse in the
empire. The extremity of slavery helped to sharpen the meaning of human rights
in a way which a less multiform deviation could not have done.19
Antislavery first succeeded during a period when there was minimal suffrage.
Abolition had to rely on appealing to the imagination of the masses to create public
opinion, something unheard of in Britain or on the European continent before this time,
as a political leverage force against the powers that opposed abolition. Drescher finds this
much more important than the role of the British legal system. Drescher asserts:
To do this in an age before mass suffrage, the abolitionists had to establish
themselves as a structure of opinion, with a weight so unequivocal and so
persistent that emancipation came to seem natural, inevitable and irreversible long
before its denouement.20
For Drescher, before abolitionism, legally sanctioned form of public opinion did
not exist. The ultra-reactionary British government viewed public expressions of opinion
with a great deal of suspicion, exacerbated by fears of sedition and revolution that were
inflamed by the British view of revolutionary events occurring in France. For Drescher,
19

Seymour Drescher, Capitalism and Antislavery: British Mobilization in Comparative Perspective (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1986), 104.
20

Ibid., 166.
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the government expected the public to follow a narrow and limited role tolerant of
slavery. A new imaginative discourse using public opinion and mass petitioning
embraced the relatively new, liberal ideology that slavery was wrong. For the masses, to
create a political effect in an age without suffrage, they had to be vocal via petitions; in
order to counter vested elite interests in Parliamentary voting. The focus by Drescher on
antislavery as essentially a popular movement, the first such popular movement in
Britain’s history, has the advantage of explaining the new involvement of the British
middle and working classes. At the same time, it has the disadvantage of drawing
attention away from the economic, political, ideological, and legal conditions that
underpin the evolution of British thought toward a stance more favorable to
emancipation.
Drescher’s take on Somerset as an epochal court case in the trajectory of abolition
makes it plain that he regards Mansfield’s decision as an extremely limited one, which
had only to do with forcible deportation and habeas corpus holding of a slave prior to
deportation. However, in his opinion, the Somerset decision had a much broader effect
than Mansfield’s narrow decision in that it effectively ended homeland claims to black
slave services while the law on the subject remained silent.21 While this gave homeland
slavery a de facto resolution, it kept the issue open for legislative action to later
effectively end.
Christopher Brown’s Moral Capital (2006) also focuses on the rise of public
opinion, similar to Drescher. British abolitionism had to create “moral capital” that the
21

Ibid., 36-38.
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abolitionists could cash in for being believed or followed on any of their other projects.
The main reason Brown uses the term “moral capital” is to distinguish the moral or
human rights side of the equation from the economic or capital side.
As to the reason for an antislavery shift in public national mood, Brown, like
Drescher, prefers ideology to economy. “To a people that wished to think of themselves
as Christian, moral, and free, the abolitionists presented an opportunity to express their
reverence for “liberty, justice, and humanity,” and at little cost to themselves.”22 This
point is important for Brown, in contrast to Drescher, Davis, and others because it
centralizes the humanitarian aspects of British culture in the abolitionist motivational
scheme and totally detaches any role for economics. This making it the exact opposite of
Williams’ original economic revisionism and in a sense returning back to earlier historian
perspectives related to British cultural imperatives as a driving force in abolition.
Brown does not focus on the role of British law in effecting abolition, which
suggests he sees legal phenomena as the effect rather than the cause of underlying forces
behind the eventual success of British abolition. Brown’s approach, which reinforces a
form of self-interested ideology under the emblem of “moral capital,” has the same kind
of advantages and disadvantages as Davis’ legalistic ideological approach. For example,
“the decisive Somerset case of 1772 gave particular attention to social consequences of
slavery,…Delphic verdict laced with ambiguities…”23 While it brings in a new focus

22

Ibid., 450.
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Christopher Leslie Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of
North Carolina Press, 2006), 96-97.
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related to ideological concepts, it does not utilize the economic and political events that
help explain Britain’s move away from a proslavery stance.
The various historians have therefore given the subject of British abolition a wide
ranging set of analytical viewpoints and come up with a number of perspectives, but this
only increases the ambiguities in explaining the course of British abolition and
emancipation. It is useful to review the trajectory of British court decisions and
legislative acts in order to arrive at a clearer understanding of this process. With the study
of legal history, a new explanation of the course of antislavery, complementary to other
past analyses, is possible by viewing the law as first an ambiguous vacuum of
opportunity for both proslavery and antislavery advocates; as epitomized by Somerset
(1777). This case allowed the abolition movement to develop, as a proslavery legal
tradition was not fully established in British homeland law, and push in the direction of
greater clarity of Parliamentary law, while at the same time Parliament was expanding its
imperial jurisdictional authority. Both of these were linked and parallel processes feeding
off each other.

17

II. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ROLE OF LEGAL TRADITIONS IN BRITISH
ABOLITION
Britain was, but one of many European nations that struggled with the concept of
abolition. In the case of earlier New World arrivals such as Portugal, Spain, and later
ones such as the Dutch and French, different approaches to black slavery were reflected
in the laws and actions of the nations over the course of the 16th through 19th centuries.
There were separate, but in some ways parallel legal traditions undergoing transformation
in these various European states, working out the course of slavery in several different
ways. British abolitionism diverged for a period from the others as it became the earliest
European nation to make statements on abolition in the form of its institutional
expressions, mainly the court cases and legislative acts that emanated from the homeland
of the British Empire.
A more detailed analysis of the evolving jurisdictional reach of British laws is one
possible approach to explain the ups and downs of British abolitionism. Before 1807,
there were few British laws limiting or outlawing slavery, if court cases such as Somerset
were not included. The court cases limiting slavery were few and limited mainly to the
cases preceding, including and following Somerset (1772). Instead of laws, the most
frequent form of resolution of problems in individual master-slave relationships consisted
of self-help options or lawsuits to gain compensation for the loss of a slave’s worth. In
this kind of free for all, chaotic context, the British government essentially took no
presiding role in advancing the rights of slaves. The 1807 Parliamentary anti-slave trade
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bill and the 1833 Parliamentary abolition bill are two major legislative examples of a
complex, multifaceted legal process. Britain had a heterogeneous, non-uniform legal
tradition, particularly in respect to colonial possessions. This fact had great influence not
only on what form abolition took, but how abolition came about.
By contrast, early and mid-nineteenth century Britain, while expanding as an
empire, had a gradual homogenization of legal application that projected the uniformity
and reach of its laws much more evenly among the colonial periphery. The British
homeland fostered a complex maze of local jurisdictions ruled over by a combination of
judicial common law, executive layers of power from local mayor to royal ruler of realm,
and an initially weak but increasingly effective Parliament. Legal homogenization
occurred in the form of court cases that set precedents about the treatment of slaves and
placed limits on the ability of masters to deport them out of the homeland.
Other court precedents newly defined and expanded rights of slaves in the
courtroom setting, such as habeas corpus (legal standing pertaining to rights of citizens)
to slaves awaiting trial. The nullification by court precedents [court rulings of Lowe v
Elton (1677) and Gelly v Cleve (1694)] excluding baptism as a route to freedom is yet
another example of this process. The concept of freedom achieved by stepping foot
ashore, the British homeland, was another point of contention that eventually proved to
be a focus for the expansion of slave rights.
The British imperium oversaw a hodge-podge of more than two dozen far-flung
overseas possessions, with highly variable degrees of autonomy and economic
aspirations. The heterogeneity of British laws was nowhere more evident than the
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multiplicity of different laws regarding slaves that proliferated in the colonies, in contrast
to the scarcity of such laws in the homeland. Each colony that operated with some degree
of autonomy from the British homeland had its own particular set of colonial laws about
the rights of slave-owners and the obligations or penalties that could be imposed on
slaves for breaking colonial laws, such as running away or resisting a master’s will.
However, courtroom decisions began a process of homogenization in which the
homeland, at least, was able to define in a more uniform manner the exact limit of slaveowners’ rights and expand the rights of slave in the courtroom. In the process of
expanding these rights, during court decisions, the British legal system was creating a
baseline for uniformity in the application of imperial law at the same time.
During the same period, the ability of the law to serve as an instrument of
feedback and democratic facilitator of popular will, instead of a fortress for the
entrenched aristocratic, or royal prerogatives, grew steadily in importance. However, this
kind of jurisdictional progression in reach from center to periphery spread very slowly
and unevenly, which helps explain the equally slow and uneven progress of abolitionism.
The number of competitive seafaring nations relying on maritime law and the
cultural pressures introduced by their legal heritages on the continental mainland also
interacted with British legal culture. For example, France not only had a slave code, the
Code Noir, to regulate relations between slave and master, but used the court system as a
buffer to keep the number of slave related petitions for freedom to a manageable
minimum. Spain had adapted its medieval legalistic traditions of slavery, inherited
largely from the slave traditions of ancient Rome, to the New World, instituting a form of
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New World slavery that was able to incorporate groups of people, such as Native
Americans, who had never before been exposed to European slavery models. The Dutch
modeled their forms of new slavery in ways that echoed those of Spain and France.
On the contrary, Britain, as a growing global empire, hosted not one, but many
legal mechanisms, sometimes overlapping in authority, sometimes ambiguous in what
was perceived to be their jurisdiction. The legalistic analysis of Davis notes several
effects: the diversity of British laws created, including an attempt at narrow
circumscription of judicial case law within the boundaries established by Parliament, to
contain the conflicts that could arise due to the “jurisdiction of common-law courts [that]
had steadily encroached upon the domain of the Court of Admiralty.”24
There was an essential dichotomy, between the concept and legal treatment of
slavery, in England and on the European continent. The Roman slave codes from which
Europe derived its modern and New World adaptations of slavery were part of a long
tradition of slavery inherited from before the Middle Ages and were thus less open to
argument or change. Britain, however, had largely escaped many of the pressures of
conformity that Rome was able to impose on her continental dominions, and many
British legal traditions had relevance and scope well outside the range of Roman
concepts, being anchored instead in the traditions of the native English people with an
overlay of Norman concepts.
As a result, British law developed in a different direction than Romanized
continental European law, including its treatment of slavery issues. The different flavor
24
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of English slavery was one in which it was never a fixed idea or strong legal construct in
Britain, but always a wavering banner of thought. Underlying all of this, a vague and
amorphous constellation of precedential laws and court rulings going back to antiquity,
conceptually framed a “constitution” for the British people. This constitution was not
only vague, but was never actually defined in a document form, making it a truly
evolutionary legal instrument for change in many areas, including the treatment of slaves.
In addition, to the seventeenth century concept of Parliamentary supremacy, Privy
Council decisions, and the Monarch often led or supplemented British national legislative
decisions and expected the British citizenry to follow suit. As the court cases of the 18th
and 19th centuries provided some guidance in the arena of slave rights, Parliament
gradually came to cement these gains in the form of national legislation, first to prohibit
the slave trade and ultimately to outlaw slavery itself.
Despite homeland constructs of antislavery, the colonies persisted in autonomous
legal behavior that simply retrenched slavery into more of a stronghold than ever outside
the auspices of homeland control. Colonial versions of this legalization of the self-help
concept often trumped imperial advisement and law during this period, especially in the
handling and fate of slaves. Regarding the appearance of slavery in the colonies prior to
the establishment of positive law, Davis asserts, “In the Caribbean, Virginia, Maryland,
and the Middle Colonies, for example, the law had come after the fact [of black slavery],
giving validation by gradual regulation.”25 The gradual onset of national regulation came
after a period of a void in guidance by the government in the handling of slaves. There
25

Ibid., 473.

22

was thus a positive void in the law that was not to fill itself in for many years, starting in
1807. However, the Royals and Privy Council, once the process began, helped
consolidate government opinion by leading Parliament toward the emancipatory laws.
Rather than influencing British laws on slavery, the effect of the European
continent was essentially null, thereby casting Europe more in the role of follower than
leader. European law arose from Roman codes of law. As such, guiding principles such
as those of Aristotle were strongly influential. On the contrary, British law from the 17th
century onward was led ever more forcefully by natural reason logic such as that
employed by Locke in his Treatises to prove the universality of human rights. However,
the colonies, using Locke’s works, chose to restrict natural reason to serve the needs only
of the white male population of the British Empire and as a reinforcement of material
prosperity of colonial entrepreneurs.
In short, international law prior to British abolitionism did not alter or lead Europe
in its slaveholding practices. British court cases helped forge the kind of consensus within
the homeland and in combination with growing jurisdictional effectiveness of the
homeland over the colonies that led the way for all of Europe in abolition. An analysis of
British court decisions helps chart the trajectory of British thought on abolition that was
to be later reflected in Parliamentary law. While the ultimate laws on British abolition, in
1807 and 1833, were legal consummations of abolitionism, they do not explain the basis
of legal thought that led to them. It is first necessary to study the court decisions prior to
the landmark Somerset case, as a backdrop to the effect of this court decision on the
template for antislavery that was to develop later.
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III. COURT DECISIONS
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF COURT DECISIONS
The pre-Somerset British metropolitan court cases present varying themes and
outcomes, sometimes favorable to slave owners, and sometimes not. By establishing legal
precedents, these decisions shaped and molded subsequent court cases and behavior by
slave owners and slaves outside the courtroom. On this basis, the early court decisions
form a distinct subset of proslavery findings, in contrast to later cases in the latter part of
the 18th century and beyond. Due to trends, the cases represent three distinct pre-Somerset
eras or phases in homeland opinion: They can be divided into 1) the cases before the time
of Lord Chief Justice Holt (1500 to 1700), 2) the Holt decisions (1700 to 1710), and 3)
the influential Yorke-Talbot opinion of 1729 (which was not an actual court case) with its
mention in a court case in 1749.
In medieval English law (laws starting round the time of William the Conqueror),
the medieval climate of England was conducive to a particular form of English slavery
called “villeinage.” Villeinage (a form of English hereditary serfdom/slavery of those
captured in battle from Norman times, that replaced original chattel slavery of the British
Isles as well as Anglo-Saxon imported systems utilizing Roman Laws on slavery)
differed from slavery in other lands by the limited rights of the serf/slave, who could be
commanded but not necessarily legally sold or deported. Judicial cases in the 17th century
display near-uniformity of proslavery decisions. Early on, British citizens, both in
homeland and periphery often preferred to resort to private, non-judicial means of
resolving disputes rather than bringing them to court. This situation changed when court
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cases began to be more respected and noticed by the media and populace as well as the
ruling classes. Because of this change, the foundations for antislavery were established.
The British saw their court system as the last resort of disputants when other
means had failed. Slave owners, aided by strong arm hirelings, would try to recapture
and ship out their escaped slaves. The slaves, for their part, would try to run away and not
be recaptured. In this they were assisted at times by free black communities such as
existed in small amounts in England at the time. Slaves brought to England often sought
escape from their owners. Occasionally, recaptured slaves sought freedom or wages for
labor. Colonial laws attempted to control the problem of runaway slaves. “Wherever
black slavery existed, the planters and their political allies ensured that local laws made
specific and severe provisions against slaves running away.”26 But, there was a huge
dichotomy between the laws created by the colonies to govern the legal response to
runaway slaves and the lack of laws on this subject in the metropole.
As a sort of two-edged sword, English legal traditions upheld the principles of
freedom in Britain, but on the other hand failed to provide any positive legal basis for
freedom beyond its shores, forcing abolitionists into a long battle to build social and
political pressures to create such positive laws. Individual attempts to challenge slavery
both in Britain and its peripheral colonies, until the 1770s, usually failed. These took the
form of civil suits in judicial courts in which a black slave attempted to gain freedom
from a slaveholder. However, many considered slaves in the British homeland, consistent
with British maritime laws, to be chattel with no civil rights, unable to testify, and unable
26
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to challenge by a writ of habeas corpus. Most of these latter cases, however, had to do
with “personal dominion” of the master over the slave.27
While law in the colonies differed in a few particulars, the colonies and the
homeland prior to 1770s were essentially uniform in denying judicial rights to slaves and
did not acknowledge them as having standing to be litigants in a courtroom. Yet, there
was a difference between the non-autonomous Crown colonies and the larger, more
autonomous, self-governing colonies such as in the West Indies:
The West Indian legislatures had always conceded Parliament’s right to regulate
imperial trade, but had insisted on their own constitutional jurisdiction over
internal affairs. The crown colonies, however, could not appeal to such
arguments.28

It is logical to assume that the more dependent, tinier colonies under the influence of the
homeland were less likely to create autonomous slave laws or resist the trends of the
homeland, while their larger sister colonies had no such restraints. As such, a minor
dichotomy between small colonies resembling the homeland and larger ones that were
distinctively different began to emerge in the empire during the end of the 18th century.
This would have the effect of accelerating the process of abolition.
In a case not named but referenced during the legal brief for the case of Pirate v.
Dalby (1786), a black slave on British soil would be considered free, but a black slave
properly bought in Virginia would be a slave in Virginia.29 This outcome also helped to
establish a kind of jurisdictional divide between how effectively laws on or against
27
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slavery could be enforced in the periphery vs. the metropole. The jurisdictional divide
was one in which the colonies retrenched in slave holding decisions including their
legislative acts, while the homeland continued a long course toward abolition.
However, the most important point in these cases was the lack of a uniformly
applicable British law that could be used interchangeably between homeland and
periphery. In the case noted above, there was mention of both periphery and homeland,
but the main force of the decision had to do with the well-established slave law in
Virginia. The need to make a distinction between peripheral law and homeland law points
out the absence of interchangeability. This was a token of the ineffectiveness of British
jurisdictional authority over the colonies, part of a much more generalized phenomenon
of the legalistic side of an early form of moral particularism then existing. As would be
typical of such court cases, the opinion of the masses counted for nothing, either before
or after the cases, which were decided by an elite group of justices whose backgrounds
and sentiments placed them squarely in the ranks of the proslavery upper classes then
dominant and nearly universal among the powerful societal groups living in the
homeland. The end result of this influence from social classes on the justice system was a
kind of entropic inertia which favored no change over change. This made it particularly
difficult for the kind of change needed to lay the groundwork for abolition.
There were several common factors of these early British mainland legal cases or
civil suits. First, these cases were very few in number, far outweighed by the vast number
of self-help actions going on daily in the lives of the slave and the free on the homeland
and in the periphery. Second, the geographic distance of the case from the British
homeland was a key feature, establishing a weakening of British homeland jurisdictional
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authority almost in proportion to the distance from the homeland. Third, British culture
took the fact of slavery for granted as a legitimated societal role that applied to blacks,
something the Somerset case in 1772 would later challenge. Fourth, British culture
entertained no special concern or consideration for the rights of a slave as a human being,
a lack of natural law applicability that was to later become a cornerstone of the work of
abolitionist Granville Sharp in his court interactions. At this early point, there were no
tools yet established for the concept of abolition to progress.
In these early freedom law suits, black slaves frequently lost. Suits based on
claims that the black slave had converted to Christianity and been baptized almost always
lost. One of the features of these suits was the lack of rights or personhood for the black
slave. He or she was regarded as property without the kind of rights a litigant in court
might assume under English law if he or she were free. This was considered true even if
the slave had been baptized. However, as Seymour Drescher asserts,
In England…the metropolitan core kept slavery at a distance by turning a blind
common law eye toward the institution. The English government fully
acknowledged property rights in persons on the Atlantic and the piecemeal
construction of slave laws in each of their colonies. It avoided creating an
imperial black code in the manner of the monarchs of Spain, Portugal, and
France.30
As Drescher implies, this was something different than had occurred on the
continent of Europe where slave codes were dominant. The dichotomy for England rested
on the geography of that of the periphery vs. homeland, rather than a unifying concept as
in the European continent.
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This led to a series of freedom suits in the early 1700s heard by Chief Justice
Holt.31 As the eighteenth century progressed, the public opinion factor in the homeland
began to operate to the disadvantage of proslavery interests and slave owners, but only
within the homeland itself, not in the colonies. This would eventually lead to growing
dichotomies between not only the content of slave related laws in the colonies (and their
conspicuous absence in metropole legislature), but also court opinions in the colonies vs.
the homeland. The role served by these dichotomies would be to help establish a basis for
antislavery on the homeland while allowing it to not be established in the periphery,
leading to a strengthening of the homeland tendency until more secure forms of
antislavery expression such as legislative acts could be achieved. A better understanding
of British court decisions requires a review of their different periods, starting with the
earliest phase in the late 17th century.

PRE-SOMERSET COURT DECISIONS
Most of the decisions prior to Lord Chief Justice Holt had unfavorable outcomes
for slaves in England. Cartwright (1564) in which the court prevented a Russian slave
brought to England from being punished publically by being whipped, was a notable
exception; the court saw whipping as a form of excessively violent punishment because
“England was too pure an Air for Slaves to breathe in.”32 Other than an awakening sense
31
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of interest in citizen liberty and a powerful phrase for abolitionists’ cause centuries later,
Cartwright did little to advance abolitionist ideas. On the other hand, it is pivotal because
it prefigured the concept of jurisdictional diversity by pointing to the homeland as a
different kind of legal climate for slaves. Before this point, there was really no distinction
between Britain and the colonies in terms of the boundaries that defined and limited
slavery. After Cartwright, the idea that slavery could have different limits in different
jurisdictions began to take hold.
Lilburne (1637) seems more of a natural rights case than one related to slavery.
The court accused John Lilburne, a book printer, of violating sedition laws and libel when
he distributed books from Holland without government license. The case assumed
national proportions when he refused to swear the Star Chamber oath (oath of telling the
truth when questioned by the court) because the normal court process at that time
required a sworn oath in order for a defendant to be properly found guilty and punished
of a criminal charge, such as the one the government was accusing Lilburne of having
committed. Lilburne’s novel and highly unconventional if not outright rebellious refusal
to swear the courtroom oath foiled the court’s stratagem. The oath was used as a trap to
allow the court to punish a defendant procedurally. It also resulted in his detention until
an eventual change in government leadership, to one more sympathetic to Lilburne’s
situation, led to his release from custody and the government’s acknowledgment that
Lilburne had been in the right. As an advocate of the rights of freeborn Englishmen,
Lilburne’s case created a bright line of rights entitlement to which, much later, black
slaves might aspire through court battles. “…the sentence of the Star Chamber given
against John Lilburne is illegal, and against the liberty of the subject; and also bloody,
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cruel, wicked, barbarous and tyrannical.”33Lilburne presented no jurisdictional boundary
line conflict, yet it provided a template for litigants in later cases to refer to when trying
to enlarge the rights of a powerless group such as black slaves or black freemen. It was a
pivotal case for the trajectory of abolitionism, however, in that it enormously influenced
the British sensibility toward enlarging freedom rights of individuals.
Lesser known court cases also echoed some of these themes. The case of Butts v
Penny (1677) involved a slave owner’s right to use ten black slaves as equivalent to
property values in a “trover” law suit (a law suit requesting a return of property taken by
another). 34 The slave owner won this case because the court held that the ten slaves had
not been baptized as Christians, but were considered pagan heathens.35 The thought
behind this ruling was the lack of Christian baptism status resulted in black slaves not
having legal status as human beings, so they could be used in court as a form of property,
thus effectively giving the slave owner generic property rights over the black slave in
England.
A number of the lesser court cases, unfavorable to baptism as a reason for
emancipation, added to the collective trend toward dichotomous geographical spaces for
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slavery and freedom. Similar findings occurred in Lowe v Elton (1677) and Gelly v Cleve
(1694). However, the rulings did not go in the counterfactual direction to state what effect
Christian baptism might have on slave owner rights in England, specifically whether or
not it could give black slaves legal rights of human beings and prevent their being treated
as property by the slave owner.36 The main effect, during these years, of minor cases was
to establish legitimacy for slavery in the colonies while creating a void of decision
making in the homeland.
Lord Chief Justice Holt decided three important, but ambiguous homeland court
decisions in the first decade of the eighteenth century, more than a half century before
Somerset. In all three, slave holders attempted to use black slaves in England as legal
property or chattel in order to satisfy civil suits for monetary damages claimed by a
plaintiff (injured party) due to the loss of property to a defendant (injuring party). The
question is at issue in Chamberlain v Harvey (1697), Smith v Brown and Cooper (1701),
and, most famously, Smith v Gould (1706). This involved whether or not slave owners
could monetarily count black slaves as chattel property having a pecuniary value in order
to satisfy a “trover” claim. Holt’s decision, for all three cases was that “there could not be
an action of trover in the case of a black slave, because the common law did not
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recognize blacks as different to other people.”37 This parsing of the meaning of trover
may have seemed trivial, but it was underlying the important idea of what limit was to be
placed, if any, on the rights black slaves might have in the courtroom.
Smith v Gould (1706) was the most important case decided by Holt because he
most clearly stated the concept and rationale for the idea that “trover lies not for a negro;
but Charta he must be liber homo.”38 With these words, Holt established the legal idea
that black slaves could not be treated the same as inanimate property, but had certain
rights of treatment shared by all humans. Even so, Holt also denied slaves the most basic
of rights, the right to not be held in prison by whim. By regarding villeinage as a
characteristic of native Englishmen and regarding property ownership of black slaves as a
municipal law related to the colonies, rather than a universal natural law, Holt effectively
drew a sharp and controversial jurisdictional distinction between homeland and colonial
laws on slavery. This would affect the reasoning and argumentation in many later court
cases leading up to Somerset (1772) and beyond. Just as importantly, his reasoning
reflected a huge gap between the perception of homeland and colonial jurisdictional laws
and raised implicit questions about the jurisdictional divide between them.
Further, many considered Holt’s lack of distinction between black slaves and
English whites in terms of natural rights to have separated out the right of service from
the right of property ownership for slave owners toward blacks while in England,
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contrary to the laws operating in the colonies, which gave both service and property
rights to the slave owner without qualification.39 To Holt, the medieval right of service
by a slave to a master, known as villeinage, implicitly could exist for black slaves
because English law did not specifically recognize black slaves as different from white
English villeins (an early example of the effect of an absence of relevant positive law).
He expressed this view in Smith v Brown and Cooper (1701), “As soon as a negro comes
into England, he becomes free, one may be a villain in England but not a slave.”40
However, since English villeins owed only service (were subject to dominion), but could
not be legally dealt with as valued property by their masters, Holt assumed black slaves
in England owed the same sort of service to their masters. This implied that a property
right over black slaves might not be fully operative in England. But, this set of decisions
by Holt seemed to conflict with the earlier decisions defeating black slaves’ freedom suits
based on lack of baptism (or their heathenism), so it created an ambiguity in
interpretation of the law. A legal void resulted, with challenges for judges. This kind of
legal muddle would, years later, invite a tailwind of contending views to try to fill the
void of negative English laws on the subject of slavery.
The English attorney general, Sir Philip Yorke, together with the English solicitor
general, Charles Talbot, composed in 1729 an informal, but highly influential legal
opinion, not based on any particular court case and having no legal standing, known
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afterward as the Yorke-Talbot opinion.41 They wrote it in an attempt to resolve the
conflict in court decisions between the pre-Holt (late seventeenth century) and Holt (early
eighteenth century) eras. The gist of this opinion was that the arrival of a black slave at
England (or Ireland) did not automatically confer freedom. “…a Slave, by coming from
the West-Indies to Great Britain or Ireland, either with or without his Master, doth not
become free, and that his Master’s Property, or Right in him, is not thereby determined or
varied.”42 This preserved the slave owner’s property right as well as the right to transport
the slave back to the colonies later. “…Baptism doth not bestow Freedom on him…”43
For the slaveholding interests, this kind of opinion was pure manna, as it supplied them
with the strongest kind of arguments to maintain their prerogatives, as well as attempting
to extinguish the dichotomy slowing gaining in general opinion between homeland and
periphery. It represented a marginalization of the things abolitionists were most interested
in establishing first in the homeland.
In 1749, in his subsequent role as Lord Chancellor Hardwicke, Yorke confirmed
this opinion. However, it had no legal status and was usable only as a persuasive (nonmandatory) opinion in a courtroom setting.44 Since it was not a court precedent, it did not
definitively solve the issue of rights between slave owners and black slaves in England.
However, it provided slave owners with a rationale to refer to in later “trover” suits.
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More importantly, the Yorke-Talbot opinion suggested a merging of law between
metropole and colonial jurisdictions with a preference for the positive law of the colonies
to rule over the void of law of the homeland and perhaps one of the few examples of
letting the inferior jurisdiction control the superior one. This casting of jurisdictional
conformity stood at odds with the Holt decisions, but was perfectly in accord with slave
holder interests. Although, the opinion had yet to be tested in court, it was clear that slave
holding interests had a predominant influence on the law.
One point that has not been sufficiently addressed is why the slave owners and
proslavery lobbyists did not make stronger efforts to secure passage of a proslavery law
or a court decision that definitively protected their legal status as slaveholders. While
some of the most important points of their position had been stated in the Yorke-Talbot
opinion, particularly the prohibition on baptism to effect emancipation, there was no
decisive court case or law to back up the monetary equivalence between slaves and
currency and the right of a slave owner to transport his slave from Britain back to the
colonies. In studying this inconsistency between slave-owner power and effectiveness in
legal machinery, Drescher points out the essentially informal nature of the “game of hide
and seek” that was occurring during the 18th century between masters and slaves.45 For
both, the informal settings outside the courtroom formed the vast bulk of decisions
between owners and slaves. For owners, this consisted mainly of hiring men to force
slaves onto ships for transshipment, or to recapture runaway slaves, or relying on the
sense of obligation to the law of those who might harbor slaves to turn them in when they
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became runaways. For the slaves, the communities of free blacks harboring and succoring
runaway slaves, plus the initial impetus to run away from slavery, were the usual
remedies of slaves subjected to brutal conditions of life. In other words, the extralegal
context of British society was large enough to encompass the majority of discordant
relations between masters and slaves, which Drescher characterizes as a form of “private
class war” between the slave class and the master class reserving only a small role for the
courts for a few high profile cases that did not fit the usual features of an extralegal
solution.46 In many cases, these court cases were more a battle between two free men
over the service value of a slave, rather than between a master and a slave.47 This
basically reiterates the view that there was a legal vacuum filled with nothing but
muddled and contradictory viewpoints. If the colonial property owners tried to fill this
void by assuming the Yorke-Talbot opinion had the force of either moral right or unstated
legal authority, they were in need of remedying the deficiency of the law only in the
arena where it meant something, such as the British homeland where competing
movements of opinion sought to secure a filling in of the void and a clarification of the
muddle. That the court cases in which this battle of opinion occurred were few and far
between is not surprising given the informal or extra-legal nature of British society in the
majority of the situations where slaves were handled.
Perhaps most important, until the latter half of the eighteenth century, British
society supported a silent consensus that ignored and tolerated the idea of slavery within
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the metropole as well as in the periphery. For instance, the court cases in which baptism
of blacks was denied as a route to freedom, such as Pearne v Lisle (1749) and the YorkeTalbot opinion, on which it was based, are relevant.48 The two judicial officers, Talbot
and Yorke, unofficially synthesized a new proslavery doctrine applicable explicitly for
the homeland. The extreme proslavery position did not allow any alternative explanations
for the lack of rights of a slave who happened to be standing on the British mainland.
Many in Britain believed this was the normative state of affairs up to 1772, when
Somerset was heard.
Although, the Yorke-Talbot opinion was persuasively proslavery in its content, a
few later cases opposed it in the decades between its reaffirmation (1749 by Yorke as
Lord Chancellor Hardwicke) and the landmark case of Somerset (1772). At least three
important interim court decisions seemed to sway the balance slightly toward antislavery
opinion during these years or at least to oppose the Yorke-Talbot opinion.
In Galway v Cadee (1750), jurist Baron Thompson found that a slave arriving in
England became a free man. Shanley v Harvey (1762) had a similar holding, this time by
Lord Chancellor Henley. 49 However, Henley’s opinion continued beyond his legally
binding decision into the speculative, but influential realm of dictum (a judicial opinion
that is not part of a judicial decision but more persuasive in nature) to render the opinion
that black slaves had the right to file a habeas corpus writ in cases where the slave owner
48
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was inflicting inhumane treatment.50 This was one of the earliest occurrences of a
discussion involving habeas corpus on the slave’s behalf in connection with English
court cases where he was the injured party (plaintiff). Although Shanley did not legally
grant the privilege of habeas corpus to black slaves, it blazed the trail for further
consideration along this line, something that would prove to be critically necessary a
decade later in cases such as Somerset (1772).
The case of Jonathan Strong (1767) was also critically important as a precursor to
Somerset. In that case, the Lord Mayor of London, Sir Robert Kite, released a jailed
black youth because “the lad … was not guilty of any offense, and was therefore at
liberty to go away.”51 This case shows what habeas corpus was supposed to be about, if
not mentioned explicitly, paving the way for future uses of habeas corpus in English
court cases.
Finally, in 1771, the Lord Chief Justice Mansfield, who would a year later hear
the Somerset case, held in Rex v Stapleton (1771) that a black slave named Thomas Lewis
could not be sent, by the alleged slave owner Stapleton, from England back to the
colonies because there was no legal evidence that Lewis was owned as a slave by
Stapleton.52 This case was more of a skirmish than a battle for abolitionists because it
resolved on a point of ownership without addressing the more important issue of the
rights of black slaves.
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The judicial course of black slavery in England was not only controversial, but
largely ambiguous and meandering, a true hodge-podge of muddled decisions seeking to
fill a seemingly unfillable vacuum, due to various unresolved issues and contrary court
decisions (along with some less than binding judicial opinions and dicta) prior to
Somerset. In particular, a select set of holdings seemed to vary from the pre-existing
accepted position that black slavery in England was a form of property. A different way
of looking at this was that the English judiciary had never before been challenged to the
extent of trying to distinguish differences between law for the homeland in relation to that
operating in the colonies, nor had it directly addressed the issue of whether a homeland
court decision could be held legally binding on the colonies as well. While the cases of
the late 17th century brought a slight amount of progress toward abolition, the next
quantum leap would occur with the Somerset case of 1772.
THE IMPORTANCE OF SOMERSET
What has Somerset (1772) brought us to? The case had an importance when it was
decided in 1772, but its importance can also be considered in terms of its enduring value.
When the decision of Lord Mansfield was stated originally, the main points were 1)
slavery in England could only be justified by positive law, 2) no such positive law was
current in England in 1772, 3) the question before the court about the detention of
Somerset for deportation was not consistent with the current laws of England and
therefore the defendant must be let go. There is the importance of Somerset as one of a
line of British court cases that helped clarify the status of slavery in England in order to
bring the issues of abolition into clearer focus.
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However, Somerset was not itself very clear in interpretation. What kind of
ambiguity did it raise? The first ambiguity was in application, whether or not the ruling
ought to be generalized to all British slaves or kept only for Somerset himself. If the
former, would the ruling help determine the ultimate fate of slavery in London, or the
entire empire? If just the homeland, what did this imply about the general British
jurisdiction within its empire? If the latter, how could the ruling be reconciled with the
abolitionist movement’s successes of 1807 and 1834? It is apparent that Somerset (1772)
was used as more than a particular ruling about a particular individual because of its
reiteration in later court cases and it contributory effect to later phases of abolitionism.
What does this imply about the place we currently occupy in the history of law?
The period before Somerset in England was, according to periodization, one of primacy
for proslavery sentiment, but also one of limited jurisdictional effect of British court
rulings. For one, they were not meant to supplant Parliament’s primary law giving
authority. The British did not have the concept of judicial review in the sense of the
judiciary being able to weigh in on a Parliamentary law for its constitutionality. This preSomerset period can be characterized as a no man’s land of negative law acting like an
emptiness or void waiting to be filled in by homeland British law on the subject of slave
rights. It was a period characterized by informality of dealings with slaves, with rare
instances of court battles mainly between two non-slave English litigants trying to see
who would win in a struggle for slaves as property. The later periods of law, including
the present, saw more of the extension of British law to cover wider segments of the
empire starting with homeland, then the sea lanes, and finally the colonies. In this
extension of judicial reach, the effect of Parliamentary laws against slavery, such as the
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acts of 1807 and 1834 were synergistic. This latter period can be characterized as
quantum leaps of clarification and filling of the void in English homeland law. As the
state took over responsibility for the treatment, classification of slaves, and the eventual
prohibition of not only slave trading, but slavery itself, the legal aura of antislavery
became ever more prominent.
In a wider sense, this transition between periods is basically what the Somerset
(1772) ruling has to say about the history of law. The use of agents to help shape history
can be seen in the strategies and successes in court decisions by Granville Sharpe. Law
has a kind of history of its own, in the sense of a succession of judicial decisions that are
related in some way to each other and may indicate a kind of progression toward a new
understanding of the law. In this sense, the history of law helps augment the other views
that are available in historical analysis and may clarify the reason why England was the
first to achieve a genuine form of abolition. The understanding of various other facets of
historical analysis, when helped by the perspective of the history of law, is like a playing
field that the history of law helps set for the other factors that have previously been
studied with regard to Somerset (1772) and British abolitionism.
1772 SOMERSET COURT CASE
The situation of slave status in the British homeland dramatically changed in 1772
when a civil case in London occurred. A runaway black slave named James Somerset
was the subject of the civil case. Charles Steuart, a Navy captain, who was to become the
chief customs officer of Boston, purchased Somerset. Steuart brought the slave with him
to England.
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Somerset soon left his master and disappeared for two years. Similarly, many
other English blacks before him had done the same. After a couple of years, Steuart
finally found and seized Somerset. He was planning to have him shipped to the West
Indies where he would be reintroduced to being a slave at hard labor. Before he could be
shipped out, however the premier British abolitionist, Granville Sharp, instituted a civil
writ of habeas corpus. This essentially meant that Steuart had to prove in court why he
should be allowed to ship Somerset out of Britain. The celebrated Somerset case resulted.
This case concluded after half a year. Several proslavery lawyers, who were hired
by the West Indies planters, represented Steuart. The planters were eager to use this as a
test case to see if the British judicial system would support their rights as slaveholders to
detain and transport slaves. On the other hand, Granville Sharp had several lawyers,
among them Francis Hargrave, to defend Somerset against deportation.
Lord Mansfield heard the arguments for and against Somerset in court. Mansfield
sought to have the case settled out of court because he did not want English judicial law
to weigh upon the case and establish a precedent either for or against the rights of
slaveholders in the metropole. He saw disadvantages to either kind of decision.
“Mansfield was an expert on commercial law and was loath to make a decision which
might disturb the property-basis of black slavery.”53 After several continuances and
delays, however, he finally made a decision. Many have recognized that decision,
although extremely brief, as an important document that symbolized the beginning of a
more positive government response to abolitionism.
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The litigants went into Somerset with different objectives in mind. Somerset
wanted to gain his freedom and not be sent to the West Indies to end his life in hard labor
as a recaptured slave. Granville Sharp’s motives are less clear. There is some evidence
that his motives were not purely humanitarian.54 In addition, to wishing for freedom for
Somerset and abolition for black slaves in general, Sharp and Hargrave gave indications
that they were disturbed at the prospect of what might happen to the British white
laboring classes with an influx of black slaves, as might conceivably happen should the
Somerset case be decided in favor of Steuart.
Somerset was unique in that the key issues of British slavery were combined into
a single case. Those issues were 1) whether the old British laws on villeinage were
equivalent and binding on contemporary black slaves in the homeland, 2) whether
colonial laws on slavery filled the void in homeland law, and 3) whether geographic
location of a slave, on the homeland vs. elsewhere, made a difference in his or her slave
status. Hargrave, speaking on behalf of Somerset and the abolitionists, argued that the
long-lost white villeinage in England could not be revived as black slavery because of
“the discouragement of it by the courts of justice. They always presume in favor of
liberty.”55
Hargrave’s main point was that positive law in England recognizing slavery died
out with the extinction of villeinage in the seventeenth century. As if confirming the
requirement of positive law in England to revive slavery, Hargrave went on to say,
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“There is now no slavery which can be lawful in England, until the legislature shall
interpose its authority to make it so.”56 This emphasis on positive law as a prerequisite for
slavery, coupled with Hargrave’s implicit assumption that it would have to come from
Parliament to be legitimate, was still narrow in applicability by the jurisdictional limits of
authority of Parliament. In terms of exciting controversy, Hargrave played up the idea
that Steuart’s team was trying “to introduce [domestic slavery] into England; long and
uninterrupted usage from the origin of the common law, stands to oppose its revival. All
kinds of domestic slavery were prohibited, except villeinage.”57 Hargrave then attempted
to show the effective extinction of both slavery and villeinage in England, leaving a void
of positive law in the homeland, to emphasize the jurisdictional difference from the
colonial positive laws on slavery.
Steuart’s West Indies supporters and their lawyers, however, had a different
perspective. Because the West Indies slaveholders had not established any particular
rights as slaveholders in the metropole, they were anxious to prove their slave holding
rights, amply buttressed by colonial laws, enforced by the law courts at home. They
wanted to consolidate their influence within the Empire in general to substantiate and
validate the institution of slavery. This is why the proslavery lawyers insisted on gaining
not only the value of Somerset’s service, but also his perpetual servitude as a returned
slave.58
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Lawyers James Wallace and John Dunning, representing Steuart’s position as
well as that of the West Indies planters, argued that positive laws of villeinage did not
invalidate slavery in England: “Villenage in this country is said to be worn out [yet] are
the laws not existing by which it was created?”59 In so doing, they prefigured the idea of
Parliamentary supremacy (or Parliamentary sovereignty) as the bulwark of the figurative
British constitution, by which an act of the legislature, no matter how ancient or currently
controversial, dominates until a later contrary law supersedes it.
In addition, Wallace argued that “Lord Holt’s opinion [that trover does not lie
with blacks in England] is a mere dictum, a decision unsupported by precedents.”60 This
approach attacked not only previous court progress toward jurisdictional differences
between metropole and periphery, but also sought to ally with an earlier period of British
recognition of stronger property holders, pushing the clock backwards for slavery. This
was a deliberate effort to reverse trends toward abolition in the homeland for a period of
time prior to Somerset.
Chief Justice Mansfield was not known to be either proslavery or antislavery.
Krikler suggests ambiguity about Mansfield’s probable attitudes about blacks, race, and
slavery based on events from his personal life as well as his court decisions. Mansfield’s
affection for Dido, the black slave who attended his niece, raises the bar of expectation
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that Mansfield, while similar in many other respects to his elite judicial brethren in the
British courts, did not regard all blacks as mere chattels. Against this is Mansfield’s
equating black slaves with chattel in his later Zong (1783) decision.61 Walvin, in his book
about the Zong case, summarizes the motivating factor for Lord Mansfield in the
following way: “Mansfield [was] keen to see no damage done to the nation’s commercial
prosperity.”62 Walvin’s phrase makes the point that Lord Mansfield was first and
foremost interested in commercial fairness and only secondarily interested in the
champions of freedom for slaves. As such, it would have seemed unlikely Mansfield
could have come up with a decision in Somerset that was favorable for black slaves, just
as it was perhaps less predictable than his comparing slaves to horses in Zong (1783).
Mansfield’s two prominent court cases that ended favorably for black defendants,
Stapleton (1771) and Somerset (1772), suggest he had some regard for the rights of
blacks.63 However, his handling of the Gregson (1783) appeal, referring to the murdered
black slave cargo as equivalent to horses thrown overboard at sea due to absolute
necessity, reopens questions about his views and that of the British judiciary on the
humanity of blacks.64
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Mansfield’s decision in Somerset was brief but ambiguous. Unfortunately, various
listeners in the audience transcribed it with questionable accuracy. At that time, there was
no official designated transcriptionist of court proceedings. One of the more credible
transcripts of that decision runs thus:
The state of slavery is of such a nature, that it is incapable of being introduced on
any reasons, moral or political; but only by positive law, which preserves its force
long after the reasons, occasion, and time itself from whence it was created, is
erased from memory.65
A summary of Mansfield’s main points would look something like this:
1. British law did not have any positive laws that gave slave holders the right to
hold and ship black slaves out of Britain.
2. Therefore British law did not recognize Somerset’s detention or deportation by
a slaveholder. Somerset was therefore discharged from slavery to Steuart.
As Mansfield had tried to suggest earlier in the case, slaveholders should try to
pursue their rights by getting Parliament to pass a positive law recognizing their rights.
He preferred the development of the positive law to adjudicating in a void of law.
Unfortunately, the brevity of his decision was such that it left itself open to many kinds of
interpretations and misinterpretations. Perhaps that is because it did not say certain things
it might have, such as whether the decision was applicable beyond Somerset himself or
what Mansfield meant by the word “discharged” when applied to Somerset’s legal
disposition.
This raised a number of questions. For one, there were questions of the
narrowness or breadth of applicability of the court decision. Did the decision mean that
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only the holding and shipping of Somerset was outside British law, or did it apply to
individuals other than Somerset, for places other than the homeland, and to slaveholder
rights other than detaining and transportation? Second, did the hearing of the case itself
establish a precedent of habeas corpus as being a concept applicable to black slaves; in
other words, did it create recognition of black slaves in the metropole as human beings
worthy of habeas corpus consideration, as opposed to mere chattel objects? Third, did the
word “discharge” as used by Mansfield mean that Somerset was entirely free of Steuart
or was he supposed to be the slave of Steuart for all other purposes while in Britain? If
the former, did that discharge apply to all blacks then living in the metropole and to all
blacks who might arrive there in the future as slaves? In order to better understand these
issues it is necessary to review the public reactions to Somerset at the time of its
pronouncement.
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IV. CREATING POSITIVE LAW
REACTIONS TO SOMERSET
Not only was Mansfield’s decision a problem for all concerned, but it would have
unanticipated effects that were relevant to the future course of British abolitionism. One
way in which to approach this is to see how it affected different groups of people at the
time.
The abolitionists, their supporting media and the homeland public ignored the
narrow and ill-defined interpretation to the Somerset decision given by Lord Mansfield.66
Their spin on the decision was to prefer to believe that it established that any black who
set foot on the soil of the British metropole must immediately be considered free. This
raised the collateral question of what constituted British soil. The colonies found
Mansfield’s decision perplexing. They wondered if it also applied to any black slave who
was physically standing on the colonial soil of the British Empire. It also did not answer
the trans-jurisdictional issue of what would happen if a former slave, set free by walking
in Britain, were to walk on the slave soil of the colonies afterward. Would he or she
revert back to a slave status just by a transitory change in location?
West Indies planters reacted by retrenching to solidify what privileges and rights
that they possessed in the colonies. This was not new to the proslavery interest. As
Swaminathan notes in his literary survey of planter rhetoric in the British periphery,
writers such as Martin and Norris had long opposed the kind of “moral economy”
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proposed as antislavery logic by writers such as Adam Smith in his Wealth of Nations.67
Arguments of self-interest and benevolent paternalism toward slaves were added to
earlier descriptions casting slaves as nothing more than chattel. 68 Therefore, slaveholders
sought validation of their property rights as guaranteed by British maritime commercial
law.69
Mansfield’s decision had not voided the possibility of future positive laws for
slavery in Britain. He did not regard it as freeing slaves in Britain or as giving them any
rights beyond the right to not be detained and transported outside Britain by slaveholders.
He did not regard his decision as allowing slaveholders who had lost slaves to the British
soil to claim any compensation for this. He did not support back wages for former slaves.
He did not even react in Zong (1783) in a humanitarian way, but merely referred the case
back for retrial, which the claimants would not do for fear of adverse publicity, since the
notoriety of the case guaranteed the public’s awareness and outrage that their claim was
steeped in murder.70
Court cases involving black slaves were not limited to the British homeland with
its common law jurisdictional concepts. A number of cases involving black slaves
originating in British maritime trade routes also occurred after Somerset (1772), using the
alternative judicial system called transmarine or admiralty law. Admiralty law was based
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on an entirely different concept of the law than British common law. It originated from
the Roman traditions like in Justinian Code of ancient times, which is the basis of all
European civil law. As it affects the issue of British abolitionism, however, British
admiralty law had little effect other than to preserve the status quo regarding the validity
of black slavery outside of the British homeland. The admiralty judicial cases not only
preserved slave status, but disregarded the slave rights implications of Somerset (1772).
One difference between admiralty law and British civil law is that the definition of slave
as chattel belongs to admiralty law. The admiralty law also favored the main presumption
asserted by the Yorke-Talbot opinion that a slave residing in Britain had only a temporary
freedom; as soon as he travelled back to a colony he became a slave again. The most
flamboyant of these cases was Zong (1783) in which Lord Mansfield compared the black
slaves who had been killed for insurance money to horses, a chattel item under admiralty
insurance law cases.
There are only a few cases of British admiralty law, other than the Zong case,
which are well known today. The earlier cases, from the years between Somerset (1772)
and the passage of the anti-slave trading bill (1808), which include Webster v De Tastet
(1797) and Williams v Brown (1802). In Webster v De Tastet (1797), the court would not
allow slaves to be insurable as chattel property.71 The idea that different court practices
could give different results did not diminish the proslavery tone apparent in most of the
admiralty cases. Williams v Brown (1802) is even more interesting because it took place
only 5 years before the British passed the anti-slave trading bill. In this case, a black
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seaman sued for back wages because he was seized from a ship while in colonial waters
and had to be ransomed off by his captain to continue his seaman duties.72 The
importance of the case from antislavery view is that the admiralty court allowed the slave
to enter into a working contract for wages even if he was considered a slave at that time.
So the slaves were considered, at least by admiralty court justices, as legally competent to
make contracts for wages. The impact of these cases considered together is that slavery as
an institution was upheld by the admiralty judges, but the treatment they gave to side
issues such as contract formation and insurance payments could go either way. In
general, however, these cases supported the proslavery viewpoint and were thus at odds
with homeland jurisprudence.
The next set of admiralty cases included one that occurred after the passage of the
1808 anti-slave trading bill, but before the 1834 emancipation bill passed Parliament. In
the Diana (1813), a British warship seized a shipment of black slaves aboard the Diana, a
ship sailing under the Swedish flag. The British admiralty court ruled that the ship owner
was allowed to have the slaves returned to him because slave trading was not outlawed in
Sweden. This was recognition of the right of another nation that subscribed to slave
laws.73 It was an example of international law being used by the admiralty judges to
cover and counter the British parliamentary law against slave trading. The admiralty
courts viewed the laws of other countries as binding on their enterprises and as not being
liable for correction by the British. This represented support for other nations’ slave laws
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even while Britain was struggling with its abolition influences to throw slavery off
altogether.
Perhaps the most celebrated of the admiralty cases other than Zong was the case
of the Slave Grace (1827). It occurred only 6 years before the emancipation law and 19
years after the anti-slave trade bill. A black slave, Grace, accompanied her mistress from
Antigua to Britain. On the return voyage to Antigua, Grace was seized as a slave being
traded in violation of the 1808 anti-slave trade bill. The admiralty justice, Lord Stowell,
decided that Grace was a slave before entering the British homeland as well as once
leaving it. He treated Grace’s slavery as a continuity that was broken temporarily only by
her being for a period of time in Britain.
“…this notion of a right to freedom by virtue of a residence in England…is
contested…upon the ground that the residence in England conveys only the character so
designated during the time of that residence, and continues no longer than the period of
such residence.” 74
Lord Stowell’s decision maintained slavery as being valid outside of the British
homeland. It added to this the idea that freedom gained while residing in the homeland
evaporated upon exiting Britain. This circumscribed Somerset totally, creating in effect
an anti-Somerset kind of proslavery zone outside of Britain.
Somerset (1772) was perceived at the time by many as making slavery illegal in
the homeland. But, to Davis it was the first firing shot in the abolitionist battle that then
relied on the second big shot, Zong (1783) to make a more powerful effect on the
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conscience of the abolitionist audience. This in turn catalyzed the development of an
important abolitionist movement that would eventually be politically potent, the SEAST
(England’s society for effecting the abolition of the slave trade). So, Somerset (1772) was
the first in a row of dominoes leading to abolition and emancipation. (“Somerset…was
popularly interpreted, in America as well as Britain, as outlawing slavery in England.”)75
In Drescher’s explanation, the main effects of this sequence were two. First,
there was a chilling effect on the further attempt at intrusion of West Indies slave laws
into the British homeland. “Whatever the weight of the West Indies interest in British
politics, it did not extend to institutionalizing slavery in the metropole.”76 Second, it
fanned the flames that led to the American Revolution, due to the conflicting dialogues it
precipitated between homeland and American colonials.
There were two unintended effects of Somerset (1772). The first was a moral
clarification of the evils of slavery. The second was a dichotomizing draw between
abolitionists and the West Indies proslavery faction. The decision did not allow the
proslavery interest to advance further into the homeland in the direction of Parliamentary
law. So again, it had a chilling effect on them in the homeland. But, at the same time it
allowed them to retrench in their colonies in the belief that Mansfield and the common
law of Britain would not be coming after them in the near future to divest them of their
slaves. “The Somerset case helped establish the British Isles, in the mind of the British, as
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a unique asylum for liberty. It might only have reinforced their toleration of colonial
slavery and the Atlantic slave trade if the American Revolution had not intervened.”77
Davis emphasizes the key organizational effect Somerset (1772) had in catalyzing
abolitionism, while Drescher is more interested in how it negated proslavery and Brown
emphasizes how the two camps settled into geographic isolation from each other. All
three views may be correct, as the rise of abolitionism and the corresponding weakening
of proslavery factions in the homeland, but their retrenchment in the colonies, were all
part of the process of parliamentarianizing the issue into national laws years later.
However, Davis looks more at the political shock wave in Parliament, while Drescher is
more interested in the American Revolution and Brown is more dubious of its effect by
itself except to divide the factions further (polarizing conflict). These are the same thing
looked at in three different ways. The galvanizing of Parliament to make anti-slave law,
the onset of the partitioning of the British Empire between Britain and America, and the
polarization effect of abolitionism were all necessary parts of the ongoing parliamentary
evolution toward greater and more mature jurisdictional control over the remaining
colonies under British control after the American Revolution.
The significance of the Somerset decision is arguable. What was its immediate
consequence in the history of British abolitionism? What wider significance did it
portend in terms of innovations in the interpretation of British law? What enduring
challenges did it pose for jurisdiction and precedent?
The direct effect of Somerset (1772) on the subsequent course of British
abolitionism is difficult to detect because there was no immediate legislative response
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between 1772 and Wilberforce’s first motion for the abolition of slave trade in 1787.
This absence of Parliamentary action was eloquent in its silence, since neither side of the
debate could move the law for many years. However, the West Indies lobby acted
effectively in a negative way, showing its ability to thwart periodic attempts by the
abolitionists to raise bills, to ameliorate slavery, register slaves, abolish the slave trade, or
emancipate the slaves. Although, the West Indies was not able to get a positive slave law
passed in England, it used its attrition efforts to keep Parliament from passing an antislave law.
Parliament and the homeland civil courts took no new major action before 1808.
However, the Admiralty courts, responsible for commercial laws of maritime England, as
well as the colonial courts, were not silent and according to commercial law, the legal
standing of cargo or chattel possessions explicitly included slaves. This contention was
nowhere more popularly known than in the infamous Zong case (1783).78 In terms of the
rights of slaves, it pointed directly opposite of Somerset (1772). Other cases, which the
admiralty law figured conspicuously, were related to actual events occurring aboard
British ships and ships of other nationalities in which the British fleet was involved.
These admiralty cases were about British ships boarding other ships looking for and
sometimes seizing, what they thought were illegally shipped slaves, contravening the
British anti-slave trade bill of 1808.
From a quite different angle, Somerset served to heighten public awareness of
imperial questions that were more important within the legal machinery of the British
Empire. For one, there was the question of jurisdiction. Did the British Empire’s judicial
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and parliamentary decisions extend in their authority to the colonies? One argument in
favor of this was that the colonies and the metropole alike were under the authority of the
Crown (the British monarch), however, the Parliament, which was also operating under
the concept of parliamentary supremacy (or sovereignty), gained theoretical authority as a
result of the Glorious Revolution and the Restoration of the monarchy after Cromwell. At
the earlier part of this process, Parliament seems not to have been sure that its authority
should be fully dominant over local municipal colonial governments. Parliament
eventually utilized this opportunity by becoming more authoritative, as separate from the
Crown. Parliament finally became superior to the Crown as the supreme authority of the
Empire, although it was timid at first to exert this power to its full extent. One example of
this inertia and timidity was the deference Parliament seemed to give to many colonial
legislatures in running their own local affairs, which included local positive laws
upholding the rights of slave holders and thereby reinforcing the institution of slavery.
This initial, voluntary ceding of parliamentary jurisdiction over the colonies seemed to
initially limit the impact of Parliament’s legislative and legal decisions.
Another after-effect of Somerset (1772) was its perceived lack of applicability to
colonial law or custom due to the presence of positive slave law in the colonies and
hostile public reception to Somerset (1772) among the colonial public. As Brown asserts,
regarding the entire course of British abolition, “The custom of colonial autonomy, then,
presented a formidable block to prospects for emancipation, as it did more generally to
the exercise of imperial authority.”79
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Other effects of Somerset (1772) are detectible if only to confirm its jurisdictional
limits in affecting the colonies. For instance, Cotter notes that the initial reception to
Somerset (1772) in the Massachusetts colony was alarming: “Lemuel Shaw, Chief
Justice of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, for example, thought that the case
may have abolished slavery in Massachusetts.”80 Several civil suits and petitions for
freedoms by blacks in Massachusetts followed, unsuccessfully due to executive vetoes by
the Massachusetts colonial governor, Hutchinson.81 In this remarkable test case of
jurisdictional reach, it is apparent that, despite the rare controversial opinions of some
colonial justices, perhaps those with a wider sense of vision judicially, the colonial
pattern of resisting homeland abolitionist views persisted. In later years, the judicial
thought process in America, while in transition from being British colonies to an
independent country would run parallel or seem to absorb some of the teachings of
Somerset (1772) even while American Revolution was ongoing.
More after-effects of Somerset (1772) in the early years of the United States
include the Massachusetts Supreme Court case of Walker v. Jennison (1781) in which a
slave named Quock Walker petitioned to be set free due to a promise of freedom he had
received from his slave owner.82 Massachusetts State Chief Justice William Cushing
recognized black slavery in that state as being in conflict with the state’s constitution. In
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effect, Walker and related cases ended all question of slavery in Massachusetts.83 Beyond
the Revolutionary War, there are traces of Somerset (1772) in later years. For example,
Ohio lawsuits involving blacks sojourning there referred to Somerset (1772) and the
Matilda (1837) case.84 The later cases in Massachusetts State perhaps set a new pattern or
trichotomy between England, the American North and the American South. In this
trichotomized view, the North and England gradually merge in their abolitionist
perspective, leaving the South to remain outside that view.
Other after-effects of Somerset (1772) include subsequent cases with similar
outcomes, such as the Scottish cases Knight v Wedderburn (1778), Montgomery v
Sheddan (1756), and Spens v Dalrymple (1769). The Knight (1778) case is pivotal in
extending the Somerset (1772) concept throughout the British Isles and giving it a
confirmatory aura. In one sense, the Scottish cases seem to give little more than an echo
of support to the principles established by Somerset (1772), without going further in the
direction of direct freedom rights for black slaves.85 However, in a larger sense, Knight
(1778) established in its wording the idea that justice and morality were on the side of
antislavery, something that would encourage the progression of jurisdictional dichotomy
that would eventually result in a parliamentary legislative reaction. The Knight (1778)
appellate decision strongly argued against distant jurisdictional control of the black slave,
Knight, from afar by a colonial law that did not have power in the British Isles for
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“sending the negro out of this country, without his consent…supposes the dominion
given over the pursuer by the law of Jamaica to be just. The negro is likewise protected
against this by the statute 1701, c.6, which expressly prohibits the carrying any persons
out of the kingdom without their consent.”86 The decision protected Knight’s rights as if
he had full imperial citizenship legal protections, indicating a vast divide from
Wedderburn’s attempted use of the positive slave laws of Jamaica to bind Knight over.
Court decisions disfavoring black slaves in the metropole continued in parallel
with Somerset (1772) and Knight (1778). In some of these cases, the court denied back
wages to black slaves working for a slave holder. The usual rationale in these holdings
was there had been no formal contract between a slave (considered a non-person in court
standing) and a free person. The most notable of these cases was Alfred v Marquis of Fitz
James (1799) in which the court would only have enforced an express (not an implied)
offer of wages to a black slave.87 The gradual increase in the court’s recognition of
metropole black rights did occur, with various cases attacking other aspects of slave
holder rights. Critically, the court ultimately did recognize black slaves as defendants
with human rights by means of not allowing them to be held against their will under the
doctrine of habeas corpus.
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Although, Somerset was the symbolic initiator of government response to
antislavery among the British, the issue of amelioration remained quiescent until
reactivated in 1787 when MP William Wilberforce began the series of parliamentary
initiatives that would take him twenty years to achieve imperial legal prohibition of the
British slave trade.88 It would take at least that long until imperial authority through
parliamentary supremacy would be able to ramify more strongly through parliamentary
laws that could span across the oceans to have effect as maritime law and override
colonial law. Along the way, there were interim cases in abolitionism. In Williams v
Brown (1802), the court stated that the slave was “as free as any one of us while in
England.”89 In Forbes v Cochrane and Cockburn (1824) slaves escaping from a Spanish
colonial plantation to a British naval vessel gained freedom because a slave coming from
“West India settlements…would thereby become as much a freeman as if he had
come into England. He ceases to be a slave in England, only because there is no
law which sanctions his detention in slavery… but they went on board an English
ship (which for this purpose may be considered a floating island), and in that ship
they became subject to the English laws alone.”90
Cases following Somerset (1772), such as Cay v Crichton (1773), King v
Inhabitants of Thames Ditton (1785), and Alfred v Marquis of Fitz James (1799) varied
in outcome.91 In Cay v Crichton (1773), the court refused to enforce the provisions of a
last will and testament that attempted to transfer slave ownership of a black, even though
the testator had died prior to Somerset (1772) in 1769. This case is especially interesting
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because both sides stipulated (legally agreed) there were no longer any slaves in the
British homeland.92
In King v Inhabitants of Thames Ditton (1785), the court rejected an attempt by a
black woman to use a local parish government office to take jurisdiction in settling a
claim by considering her as a member of the parish accessible to its resources.93 The main
point decided in this case was that claims for wages cannot be made by a slave against
the master because slavery is not a form of legal hiring; indentures on the other hand are
legal hiring with a legal constraint to serve the master and so are accessible to wage
claims. However, this post-Somerset ruling by Mansfield reiterated his innuendo, so
ambiguously phrased in Somerset (1772), that the British laws should exclude either
current or former black slaves from access to the free man’s poor laws system of
England.94 This maintained the impression that, in the homeland, slavery and slaves
remained invisible to the law. In Alfred v Marquis of Fitz James (1799), as noted above,
the court would not allow a black man back wages from a master since slavery was not
recognized as a contractual type of service with wages.95 The issue of wages for the labor
of slavery was more of an economic attack on the institution of slavery than one
involving the expansion of human rights for black slaves; in other words, not an issue of
legal or political abolition.
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Rather than a step forward, Somerset (1772) can be viewed from a legal
perspective as a type of status quo solidification between barriers to judicial authority.
Such barriers would bolster abolitionism within Britain while diminishing its force
abroad. This would have a polarizing effect between homeland and periphery. However,
that aggregation was more of a legislative evolution than a judicial one and requires a
different kind of non-judicial and legislatively-focused analysis. Therefore, the earliest
developing phase of abolitionism had not yet formulated a strategy based purely on either
amelioration of slavery conditions or emancipation, either gradual or immediate. There
were, rather, many versions of abolition, but no single unified theme.

EXTENDING PARLIAMENTARY JURISDICTION IN THE EMPIRE
The court cases established a vacuum or absence of positive law (actual written
down law) and contradictory rulings, creating jurisdictional confusion, which eventually
demanded a legislative response. Although, historians of British abolition have not often
analyzed the evolution of Parliamentary authority in slavery issues from national to
global from the perspective of the law, there were three distinct jurisdictional phases of
British imperial expansion: 1) A British homeland phase from approximately 1772 to
1807, characterized by a growing popular wave of abolitionism in the homeland without
a corresponding increase in resoluteness by Parliament, a de facto absence of slavery in
the homeland, and a lack of jurisdictional authority over colonial legislative affairs
including colonial laws on slavery. This manifested as thwarted and ineffective
Parliamentary legislative action until the passage of the anti-slave trading bill in 1807. 2)
A maritime phase from 1808 to 1833, characterized by the extension of Parliament’s
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jurisdiction and suppression of slavery from homeland to the seas controlled by the
British Empire. 3) A colonial or global phase from 1834 to 1840, beginning with the
passage of the emancipation law of 1833 and its gradual application to the colonies,
marked by globalization of Parliamentary effectiveness in abolishing slavery in the
British Empire.
Historians have left a void on the subject of challenges to parliamentary
sovereignty on the slavery issue. It is not clear if this is because the concept has been
taken for granted from a homeland oriented perspective or the challenges by colonialists
apart from the American Revolution were few and far between. However, it is the
challenges to parliamentary sovereignty that temporarily hemmed in the expansion of the
imperial jurisdictional concept and delayed its fullest development. Jurisdictional
expansion occurred in contingent stages as the British Empire expanded.
The abolitionists pressed Parliament to take on a larger and more imperial role.
Prior to the English civil war and the Glorious Revolution of 1688, Parliament was not
the supreme law of the land, but was instead dominated by the Royal prerogative. After
the Glorious Revolution, the principle, if not reality of parliamentary supremacy was
established as a template for its eventual fruition. One insightful analysis of
parliamentary sovereignty is actually a study of British constitutionalism by Justin
Buckley Dyer. In his analysis of the challenges, to British constitutionalism, Dyer asserts
that the liberty interests behind the development of abolitionism in Britain induced
Parliament to actualize these interests by simultaneously drawing upon the theoretical
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assumption that it had a sovereign authority over the rest of the empire, one that could not
be gainsaid by contrary court decisions or unauthorized royal decrees.96
The importance of distinguishing between these phases, for the purpose of
studying British abolition, is that with each successive new incorporation involving the
spread of legal power of enforceability of homeland parliamentary decrees, a greater
degree of legal uniformity and homogeneity, paralleled at some point by a greater degree
of popular democratism in shaping the deliberative body of representatives authoring
those decrees, reflected an increasing wave of feedback between public opinion, and
governmental policy. The combined effect of growing parliamentary authority to global
proportions and increased sensitivity of Parliament to popular opinion gave abolition the
essential tool it had previously lacked for achieving its goals.
Several facets to the first phase of Parliamentary growth of power, the homeland
phase, are pertinent here: First, it was not clear during this time period whether the law
extended in jurisdiction only to the homeland. This was a hot topic because many at first
tacitly assumed that parliamentary supremacy meant Parliament’s authority or imperial
jurisdiction was absolute and universally applicable, including over the colonies. This
was before clever objectors to Parliamentary interference in the domestic affairs of
colonies arose and advanced ambiguity as a refutation to parliamentary supremacy when
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it was putatively being held over the internal affairs of colonies. Davis provides an
excellent example of this in the attempt of MP Charles Ellis in 1792 who
persuaded Parliament to support recommendations to the colonial governors, to be
circulated by the crown, for domestic legislation that would decrease the islands’
dependence on the African [slave] trade.97

Davis makes it clear that many interpreted this as a lessening of parliamentary
“jurisdiction over the slave system,” meaning the domestic legislative domain of the
West Indies colonies in question.98 It was a pretext for the proslavery lobby to indicate its
resistance of the fundamental nature of parliamentary supremacy when expanded
overseas.
Sachs articulates a powerful argument for the role of colonial legislators as a key
resistant factor to the spread of British imperial jurisdiction in her article about the
Coleman family lawsuits in Revolutionary and post-Revolutionary America on behalf of
freedom petitions for American slaves of mixed Indian and African heritage. According
to Sachs,
Beginning in the 1760s, a new generation of colonial lawyers articulated a radical
critique of imperial policy as violations of both constitutional and natural rights…
First presented by James Otis in his 1761 case against the Writs of Assistance,
this thinking cast imperial measures as abuses of parliamentary authority and,
therefore, as violations of constitutional law. More importantly, they conceived of
such violations as contrary to the basic set of God-given natural rights that resided
in every individual.99
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Abolitionism in its nascent development was at first neither ameliorative nor
abolitionist during this phase. There were well-organized proslavery forces in the
legislative Parliamentary houses of the Commons, the Lords, and the royals (monarch).
This was one key reason why Parliament and its partners in national power managed to
delay and scuttle Wilberforce’s anti-slave trade proposals time and again, from the 1780s
until its passage in 1807. The delaying agents came from not only the House of Lords and
the Royals, but also internally from an initially strong proslavery contingent in the House
of Commons. The antislavery forces benefitted from anti-Jacobin public reaction linking
supporters of the French Revolution with antislavery politics in Britain. In addition, the
Royals were often actively hostile toward not only abolition but slave trade prohibitions.
Perhaps the most explicit example of this is the first public political speech by the Duke
of Clarence (the future King William V) in 1792 when he reacted to the French slave
revolt on San Domingo (Haiti) by declaring that “it [black slavery] ought not to be
abolished at all.”100
The decision of the Jamaican legislative body to resist the 1807 anti-slave trade
bill was even more symbolic of the resistance to the imperial extension of parliamentary
sovereignty at this point:
“In a series of resolutions adopted October 29, 1807, the Jamaican House of
Assembly asserted its exclusive and absolute right to make all laws for the
internal governing of the island; denied the right of Parliament to interfere in its
domestic concerns; claimed that no laws could be binding on those not
represented in the parliament which enacted them; and recognized their duty to
resist by all constitutional means any law that subverted the ancient principles of
the British constitution.”101
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The second development phase for Parliamentary power extension was the
Maritime phase (1808-1833). This period saw British supremacy on the seas in the
process of fighting against Napoleonic Europe. This phase was relevant because other
European nations were strongly opposing British parliamentary sovereignty as a
harbinger of British imperial global hegemony. However, the British imperium’s strength
globally, as witnessed by its naval power, was fully capable of implementing the
expression of abolition in the form of prohibitions on the slave trade, as in the 1807
parliamentary act.
The British Royal Navy, specifically the West Africa Squadron and the
commercial maritime or admiralty laws for the high seas enforced this maritime
jurisdiction, as applied to prohibition of the slave trade. However, the homeland British
government also traditionally controlled the metropolitan municipal laws of Britain,
setting up a potential conflict of laws.
The aim of this phase as it regards slavery was actually, merely ameliorative, not
abolitionist. The abolitionist strategies were not uniform and unified, but changed over
time from ameliorative to emancipatory. The ameliorative strategy was devised as a
compromise or second best strategy realizing that the nation would not go to the extreme
of emancipation in a single step. Its main advantage was as a measure of compromise
between the interests of slaves and slave owners. The parliamentary 1807 slave trade act
aimed to indirectly improve the lot of slaves in the periphery without directly freeing
them, by cutting off the supply of new imported slaves to the colonies. The idea of
amelioration was a theoretical one and speculatively based on the logic of the law of
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supply calculated to affect the emotions of the slave owner. The government assumed this
would decrease the colonial supply of slave labor and make slaves more precious to their
owners. The owners would then presumably treat their slaves more compassionately, as
their external, import supply of new, replacement slaves would be cut off. In short, this
phase aimed to better the existing conditions of slavery, not end it. This strategy was a
total failure at bettering condition, besides not meeting the goal of freedom for slaves.
Another possible abolitionist motive for pushing the anti-slave trade bill was to decrease
the number of slaves in existence. Its rhetoric was anti-slave, but its practice was
ameliorative. So it had both an express intent of amelioration and an implied intent of
decreasing slavery, both of which were without the benefit of emancipating current
slaves.
During this second, maritime phase, Parliament claimed jurisdiction over the seas
and the slave trade as part of its expanding functional jurisdiction, which ran parallel to
Britain’s growing sea lane hegemony as it beat down Napoleonic French fleet and their
allied fleets from Spain and Holland. The British West Africa Squadron had the
capability to go ashore or fire cannons from their boats offshore to destroy slave centers
of trade in Africa and to land in the colonies with armed force if need be to apprehend an
illegal slave vessel that might be harboring at a colony. It also assumed the right to seize
and search seafaring vessels flying non-British flag colors. At the same time, Parliament
often maintained a more than healthy respect for colonial affairs and colonial municipal
government by allowing the colonies’ legislatures to rule locally, including their
unchallenged use of positive slave laws. So, powerful as it may have seemed, the second
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parliamentary phase was actually a force of continuity more than a force for change and
as such; was doing the opposite of interfering with colonial slavery.
Proslavery forces organized quite effectively during this period and actively
resisted abolition in whatever political and economic shape it presented. However,
antislavery forces became increasingly well organized and would eventually align
themselves with parallel reform movements involving non-slaves, such as labor and
women’s rights. At this point, from 1808 to 1833, no one confused these human rights
based liberalizing forces with their more revolutionary counterparts, republicanism or
radicalism. The antislavery forces mounted an increasing influence over the younger
Lords and Royals coming of age, as their older, proslavery predecessors began retiring or
dying of old age and disease. Despite this seeming equilibrium between antislavery and
proslavery forces, antislavery forces encountered discouragement upon seeing that
amelioration strategy was failing to have any effect due to colonists’ resistance to change.
This led to a shift toward total abolition as a new strategy. Even so, the new strategy took
from 1808 to 1833 to get action in Parliament.
The third and final time period of parliamentary jurisdiction uniformity and global
expansion was a trans-Colonial phase (1833-1840). During this period, the imperial
jurisdiction of Parliament extended and dominated over all of the empire including the
colonies, unless the colonies enacted a superior law that was even more benign to former
slaves than the parliamentary slave abolition act of 1833.
While generally more expansive, the trans-Colonial phase of parliamentary
authority was a gradualist type of legislative regime. For instance, the slave emancipators
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chose a doubtful apprentice system as a way to make the change more gradual.102 It
retained most of the functions of servitude for former black slaves in the colonies, while
giving a few nominal rights of free persons. However, the original plan was to take years
to end apprenticeship; the indemnity provisions favored slaveholders and were not a form
of restitution to the slaves.
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V. CONCLUSION
Attention to the legal dimensions of antislavery adds to our understanding of
timings, methods and success of the movement in the British Empire. It extends the
insights of earlier historians who examined the social, moral, and economic factors at
play. Ever since Eric Williams challenged the simple humanist explanation of
abolitionism, historians have explored a complex range of factors that shaped antislavery.
The developments in law help to explain why abolitionism arose when it did and also the
difficulties it had to overcome over many decades before it could succeed.
While, abolitionism for the British Empire would have to wait for the
parliamentary law of 1833 to liberate black slaves in the colonies, the British homeland
found the situation far different for its own local population of black slaves. A series of
British court cases in the 18th century denied slaveholder rights in Britain, but left slave
law undetermined. This was both a firm foundation and a great challenge of abolitionism.
Expanding political participation and the extension of parliamentary legal powers beyond
Britain were the means for eventual antislavery victory.
The British experienced the development of a government more favorable for
abolitionism due to the eventual occurrence of court cases that effectively ignored
slaveholder rights to transport black slaves (such as Somerset) and the gradual expansion
of parliamentary jurisdictional authority from one limited to the homeland to one
encompassing the trans-Colonial empire. With increasing homeland judicial recognition
of black slaves’ rights and the gradual extension of parliamentary jurisdictional authority
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to encompass Britain’s colonial periphery, the imperial policy changed to a more
comprehensive and legally enforced, form of freedom for black slaves involving not only
the further rights of those in the homeland, but also in the colonies.
From the early 1700s onward, a succession of landmark homeland court cases
involving the rights of black slaves led to various interpretations of the limits of slavery.
The idea that slaves might have different rights in different jurisdictions first came to
light in the natural rights case of Lilburn (1637) when the famous phrase from Cartwright
(1567) was recruited (“England’s air is too pure for a slave to breathe”), but was little
more than rhetoric at the time.103Butts v Penney (1734) rejected baptism as a possible
gateway to freedom for slaves.104 In Smith v Gould (1701), the idea that black slaves
could not be treated as merchandise for litigation purposes because white villeins could
not, raised white villeinage as the homeland rights standard against which black slaves
had to be judged.105 In 1729, the Yorke-Talbot opinion created a new barrier, although a
non-official one, to the idea of the British homeland as a freedom zone for slaves.106
Finally, Shanley v Harvey (1762) opened the way for the writ of habeas corpus to be
used as a powerful tool on behalf of blacks seeking freedom in court suits.107 All of these
important judicial concepts and more would come to fruition in the landmark case of
Somerset (1772), when the absence of positive parliamentary laws for slavery on
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Britain’s homeland soil would be a sufficient reason to disallow enforcement of a slave
holder’s claims to deport a runaway former slave.108 With the exception of the YorkeTalbot opinion, most of the later homeland court decisions advanced the cause of
abolitionism by providing greater and greater legal justification to provide black slaves in
court with the necessary legal tools to be able to win court cases against slave holders.
A legal analysis of the British imperial evolution that recognizes expanding
natural rights and parliamentary sovereignty trends toward universal imperial jurisdiction
adds to our understanding of these events. This suggests that the maturation of British
jurisdictional reach and the other factors studied by previous historians are interrelated.
A point worth considering is why Britain antedated other European nations in the
choice to enforce antislavery. Britain, as contrasted to European nations on the
continental mainland, did not have slave codes or codified constitutional laws that dealt
with slavery explicitly. While the concept of slavery from medieval times was well
known to British scholars as well as continental ones, it was the European continent that
chose to express the institutions of slavery in no uncertain legal terms. Britain, lacking
not only an explicitly constructed constitution, but contemporary legal expressions that
distilled slavery down to a legal formula or description, gave more of an open playing
field to allow the various forces in British society to jockey for position to influence the
outcome of slavery and antislavery in Britain. The very ambiguity that characterized
much of British law, and courtroom rhetoric, in comparison to the more explicit
codifications and managed handling of slavery issues in countries such as Spain and
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France, allowed the British to lose what small hold slavery had taken on the British
homeland without much legal effort. The best evidence in support of this is the way in
which British slavery faded away in a de facto way after a simple, but ambiguous
statement by Lord Mansfield in the Somerset case (1772), with the help of the British
media and the antislavery factions, and with very little resistance by antislavery elements
in the homeland. Given such a loose and ambiguous legal environment, Britain had
perhaps the best chance to achieve an early victory in antislavery. There was also a
progressive trend toward emancipation that proceeded in steps through prohibition of the
slave trade to actual emancipation, without much in the way of reversals, except for
hiatus periods during which the movement lagged, but did not find itself reversed.
Of much greater significance to British abolitionism and other contemporary
movements involving British liberal philosophy during the late eighteenth century and
early nineteenth century, the forces of legal controversy unleashed by Somerset (1772)
and other cases may have contributed significantly toward a much more widespread form
of legal revisionism within the British Empire. The extent of this legal revisionism
involved not only a strengthening of the concept and enforcement of imperial jurisdiction
across the seas and in the colonies, but also partook of a greater sensitivity on the part of
the central British government to the democratizing opinion of the population at large.
In the traditional manner of English law, the Somerset (1772) ruling was so short,
narrowly crafted, and ambiguous it frustrated both proslavery and abolitionist factions
seeking definitive resolution of the broad-based questions of English slavery. Eventually,
the fruit of this ruling and others helped turn the tide against proslavery advocacy.
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However, for immediate purposes, English judicial law during the Holt, Yorke, and
Mansfield eras refused to resolve whether or not slavery was legal. For example,
Somerset’s discharge created an ambiguity in interpretation of the law until, eventually,
British legislative acts created a new kind of positive law that filled the void. In a larger
sense, the vacuum of positive homeland law had an observable effect of galvanizing each
side to attempt to fill the void. In this sense, the void of homeland law on slavery
indirectly pushed toward positive antislavery laws that provided a wide ranging and
imperial conclusion to the British position on slavery
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